











The statistical style of Lucien March.





La réalité n’est qu’un vestige dans l’immense étendue des possibilités. Celles-ci ne forment pourtant point un chaos.
―Lucien March, “Statistique”

The development of economic thought in France has long been characterized by a local idiosyncrasy: the tradition of ingénieurs économistes. Through their grappling with economic problems that confronted the public sectors and with concrete issues tied to the constructive problems undertaken by the state, engineers have often shown signs of originality and savoir-faire ―it has even been claimed that they “do economics while others talk about it” (Caquot 1939, in Divisia 1951, x). Anyway, they laid the foundations of microeconomics (Ekelund and Hébert 1999), committed themselves in an early mathematization of economic issues (Kurita 1989) and, in a sense, paved the way for econometrics (Hébert 1986).
	But they also developed an indisputable talent for measurement in economics, exemplified by their work on costs. This involvement of French engineers in measurement and more generally in statistics became particularly apparent around 1900: the Statistique Générale de la France (SGF), the main government statistical agency of the time, even became an engineers fortress. Although the SGF remained a small center in comparison with other European statistical bureaus, the work achieved during the early 20th century remains impressive, in two directions: the collection of data and the elaboration of explanations of what has been measured. Lucien March (1859-1933) deserves a special attention in this involvement of engineers in statistics and measurement. He entered the Ecole Polytechnique in 1878, became an engineer from the Corps des Mines and was head of the SGF from 1899 to 1920​[1]​. March finds no easy home in our contemporary schemes, in the sense that he breaks with standard classifications: he reshaped the French statistical system, imported the new statistical techniques devised by British biometricians, investigated the field of time series analysis, contributed to the spread of eugenics in France, promoted lectures in statistics, at a time when they remain scarce, and made noteworthy incursions in economics and demography; last, but not least, he developed a philosophy of science based on measure that ―in some respects― illustrates the importance of the state in developments in measurement, as other papers of this volume suggest (Porter, Comin, Kohli).
In this paper, we will dissect March’s way of doing statistical research. Such a work is not only motivated by the fact that his full contribution to the history of statistics has received scant attention. The paper originates in two other reasons, both related to his specific approach of statistics. First, we would like to suggest that the feature of econo-engineers is not only to be found in technical innovations but also in “non mathematical arguments”, as Kurita (1989, 8) suggests in a sibylline way. Indeed, their general training and practice sometimes led them to “take a detached view of their field” (Divisia 1951, 141) and to develop epistemological frames that remain underappreciated in the contemporary literature. Second, in debates that recently occurred in the field of macroeconometrics, several protagonists ―for instance Summers (1992)― questioned the usefulness of contemporary theory and called for more empirical inquiries as well as for more epistemological foundations. On this point, past episodes can afford enlightening lessons: several engineers of the 19th century and of the first half of the 20th century rooted their practice of statistical economics in well-shaped epistemological arguments ―and such explanations, developed by scholars who are reputed to be pros of mathematization, of quantification and of measurement, could certainly be instructive. We got precise answers to both questions in the work of March, who carefully elaborated new tools for the statistical work in the social sciences and rooted them in an epistemological framework and in worldviews that were drawing the scope and the limits of statistics. This association of statistics with worldviews delineates what we label March’s statistical style.
We analyze this style in three steps. Part one deals with the way March saw statistics ―its nature, properties and range of application. We will see that statistics was approached as an objective and scientific way to deal with complex phenomena and collections of heterogeneous facts. In part two, we focus on the way he concretely contributed to statistics, in two directions: the statistical methods and their application to economics. It will be emphasized that his work is characterized by the search for methods that could make possible the discovery of regularities at work in a complex and moving world, and also that he constantly put forward the limits of his own results. Finally, part three sheds some light on March’s worldviews that assign a precise role to statistics. It was a means of approaching, measuring and taming a social world characterized by an epistemic uncertainty, and his work is only meaningful in the frame of this epistemology, that draws the scope and the limits of statistics.

1.	On numbers and measurement: Delineating statistics

From the very beginning of his scientific career, March carefully tried to identify the nature and the frontiers of statistics. Such was not an easy agenda: at a time when the application of statistical procedures to the social sciences was controversial in France (Ménard 1980) and when statistics was even derided (Porter 1995), March suggested that it was however a path based on precise and scientific criteria that should be followed in various disciplines.

1.1.	Statistics as “une langue commune”

March thought that the identification of the territory of statistics resulted from the identification of the limits of the experimental method:

The methods that suit the experimental sciences, and that are based on the possibility to isolate one circumstance among all those that coexist in a phenomena, do not perfectly apply to the observational sciences, in which a fact can never be reproduced in the way it has been produced, and where the invariability of the adjacent circumstances, with the exception of one, can never be realized (1924, 341)​[2]​.

Thus, “when we do not control the main circumstances of observation, the statistical method is to be applied” (1930a, 9), and the scientist can only observe the facts “as they appear” to him (1930a, 11). Statistics was thus a substitute for the experimental method. March shared here the views of other social scientists of the time: Morgan (1990) indeed suggests that the use of statistics, especially by economists and the first econometricians, was based on similar arguments and that more generally this problem “arose in other social sciences and in natural sciences where controlled experiments were not possible” (1990, 9).
	Although these views were not original, March’s arguments deserve attention. In various textbooks, he explained that, in contrast to the experimental method, statistics was the concern of complex phenomena and heterogeneous collections:

These facts are generally ruled by complex influences that it remains impossible to separate or to control at will. They arise from the shock of circumstances that we do not master, and often from intentional facts whose scattering and capriciousness disconcert (…). The phenomena that are studied are often influenced not only by causes that operate in the scope of observation (for instance, the health of workers in the case of wages); but also by causes that largely preceded observation (for instance those relative to heredity, habits and traditions in human societies). In short, the complexity of the range of observation is particularly important in the studies of collections of living beings or of social facts (1930a, 14-5).

At that stage, March’s thought spread in two directions.
First, given its complexity, the human world could only be observed, and its knowledge was requiring data. Straightaway, it can be remarked that such a requirement can be illustrated by the institutional role played by March in France at the turn of the century. In 1892, he joined the Office du Travail (OT) created one year before and that aimed at studying the various sides of labor​[3]​. At that time, the SGF was a department of the OT​[4]​. That precise linkage was not the result of pure chance: it was necessary for the OT to get precise information on national economic structure as well as on individuals, and such information could be collected through census that fell inside the scope of the SGF. The SGF reported regularly on demography and economics (industrial structures, wages, etc.) and collected numbers for various ministries and administrations, and some of these results were published in the associated review, the Bulletin de la Statistique Générale de la France. The work achieved during this period was impressive, especially concerning the collection of data, and the whole is largely to be attributed to March (Huber 1937). But March’s conception of observation requires more precision. To him, social scientists had “to describe carefully and to measure as exactly as possible the facts to be observed” (1924, 331). Consequently, statistics and measurement were closely associated ―“the method of statistics intervenes when we want to measure” (1908, 290). His historical survey of the development of statistics precisely led him to believe that “the development of a lot of sciences has followed the creation or the improvement of instruments of measure that made possible immediate and objective determinations of what was studied” (1924, 326). Otherwise stated, just like he defined statistics on a basis of exclusion, he identified its range of application through the elimination of non measurable phenomena, such as those of psychology (1924, 332) ―and we guess that March never appreciated the “calculus of pleasures and pains” discussed by Maas in this volume. Yet, statistics had a wide range of application, as March’s applied work illustrates. It mainly covers demography and economics, and the whole is an hymn to statistics: it was constantly based on measurable phenomena or on phenomena that he contributed to make measurable, such as unemployment (Topalov 1994). Less known is perhaps his involvement in eugenics. From an institutional point of view, he contributed to the creation in 1912 of a French society devoted to the promotion of eugenics, the Société Française d’Eugénique, and in various papers, he never concealed his eugenic beliefs​[5]​. From a methodological point of view, this involvement is perfectly coherent with the other issues he tackled: eugenics meant a quantification and a measurement of hereditary make-up of the individuals, “a reduction of people to numbers” (MacKenzie 1981, 34).
	Second, such a gathering of data and measures was seen as the unique means to approach the social world. Some regularities could then be unveiled, and statistics precisely aimed at the discovery of signs of constancy, of order out of chaos of complex phenomena:

Because the human mind does not easily understand a complex or variable group, it can only exert its power for generalization through the reduction of complexity to more simple notions, of variables to something constant. The method of statistics tends toward that (1924, 327).

This idea was not highly original: March exemplifies the 19th century use of statistical methods, in which relations were extracted from varying measurements (Porter 1986), although it should be remarked that he got rid of the belief that Nature was basically a simple machine.
	March thus saw statistics as closely associated with observation and measurement. It was offering means of reducing heterogeneous data and of identifying regularities in mass phenomena ―in “Statistique”, a masterly paper published in 1924, statistics was defined as la pléthométrie. It was also “une langue commune” (1924, 363), applying to large territories and to a large diversity of objects. Just like Pearson, he believed that “it provided the proper discipline to reasoning in almost every area of human activity” (Porter 1995, 20). The foundations of such an ambition need now some explanations.

1.2.	Objective foundations of measurement and statistics

March exposed the way statistics could extract regularities that reach a scientific status. Statistics was defined as a three step process including observation, the determination of results and finally their interpretation and forecasting exercises. This final step was seen as ruled by personal and subjective judgements and was thus excluded from the range of science. By contrast, the scientific status of the preceding steps was based on their objectivity: statistics “helps in reducing the conjectures, in gaining precision in the objective dimension of the results of observation, and consequently in increasing the scientific value of these results” (1924, 364).
	The scientific dimension of the first step, that of observation, originates in the elaboration of nomenclatures and in the training of collectors. Both were seen as making statistics objective, in the sense that they contribute to “the elimination of particular and personal influences” (1924, 337). Nomenclatures as such deserve little attention, but it should be remarked that March believed that they were objective tools as soon as their structure​[6]​ was detailed in such a way that it minimizes the collectors’ doubts. Interestingly, he also advocated the need for homogenous nomenclatures at the international level: they would be “universal conventions” (1930a, 5), standardized tools that exclude judgement. In that sense, he had in mind a kind of objectivity associated with distance, that transcends the frontiers and that remains close to the way Porter analyzes quantification as “a technology of distance” (1995, ix). The search for objectivity in the collection of data was also at work on the side of collectors: “The observer has to indicate no personal tendency; his impartiality has to be absolute” (1924, 330). March stressed the need for the training of collectors, who have to be “impartial”, “honest” and “competent” (1924, 328) ―such a “morality” was leading to a reduction of errors in the collection of data. He thus thought that careful and objective measurement was a prerequisite for a scientific work in statistics.
	The second step was that of the determination of results, i.e. the extraction of constant results from measures. Once more, objectivity was at work: aggregate results aimed at identifying what individual cases share in common (1924, 342), and they were also transcending personal behaviors. To reach this aim, the statistician had to use appropriate tools: graphs, index numbers, the correlation coefficient and the principle of compensation, associated with the normal law. The latter deserves here some attention. March recognized that it was helpful ―and more generally that “the use of more or less elementary mathematical schemes makes possible the determination of objective values” (1909, 255); yet, he also believed that it was not realistic: it was “an ideal model” (1909, 255) or a “bold hypothesis” (1912c, 378) and other kinds of distribution were available (1908, 293). The key to this puzzle is to be found in his belief that science needs conventions: the Gaussian law was “precious since (…) it establishes the practical unity of [a] group” (1909, 255-6) ―it was a “frame” that sets precise limits (1910, 485). Similar arguments were developed concerning the correlation coefficient and index numbers. Although these tools could ―and should― be criticized, they were parts of the conventional language of science and made possible the coordination of scientific activities; such routines work toward objectivity.
	These two steps were an objective and a scientific path from the heterogeneous, individual and complex facts to aggregate results. This statistical path deserves two comments. First, March constantly insisted on the need for identifying ―and also for overcoming― the limits of every component of these steps. It is striking to note that his whole work leaves an important room to criticism, to what he labeled “scientific criticism” (1924, 323) ―that was for instance associated with the search for more realistic conventions. Second, he stressed the need for the elaboration of a precise and simple vocabulary. A precise vocabulary, in the sense that any confusion should be banished. For instance, “one has to regret that words such as probability, correlation, that possess a well determined meaning in the mathematical language and in logic, are used differently in statistics” (1909, 262). As seen in part three, he harshly criticized the assimilation of correlation and causality that was practiced by several statistical economists of the early 20th century. Otherwise stated, March claimed that we cannot demand too much of the tools used in statistics, and ask for more than their hypothesis stipulate. A simple vocabulary, also, in order to avoid any misunderstanding: he hoped that statistical tools could also be used by non specialists, for instance businessmen.

2.	Graphs, coefficients, barometers: March’s measurement implements

It is now necessary to dig deeper and to analyze the way March approached and practiced statistics in his concrete work. We will here suggest that his contribution to the elaboration of statistical tools for the social sciences as well as his economic work, especially on business cycles, perfectly illustrate the way he extracted regularities from heterogeneous data ―and also the way he put forward the limits of such attempts.

2.1.	Fechner and Pearson revisited: New tools for the comparison of socio-economic time-series

March remains nowadays known for a study devoted to the comparison between socio-economic variables, Les Représentations Graphiques et la Statistique Comparative (1905), that aimed at presenting two kinds of tool that he saw useful for such an enterprise: graphic representations and mathematical indices, labeled indices de dépendance.
His analysis of the latter deserves here special attention​[7]​. The paper opened with Fechner’s indices​[8]​ that were pedagogically exposed and applied to various examples: the relationship between marriage and birth rates in France and the relationship between several financial variables such as the Banque de France cash balance and discount rate. He then presented “improvements” of Fechner’s indices and moved towards Pearson’s coefficient of correlation. But the use of these indices led him to face a problem relative to time:

In the previous studies, we have supposed that we dealt with annual changes. But it frequently appears that, in the changes that affect statistical facts, we can distinguish various phases. We will distinguish yearly changes, changes relative to several years (for instance decennial changes), secular changes and of course changes relative to periods inferior to one year (1905, 32).

He thus recognized that transferring a tool devised outside the social sciences requires adaptation. Actually, the correlation coefficient could not be immediately used by economists, since economic laws did not deal with variability within the population: “rather, socio-economic data were often single observations connected together to form a time-series which exhibited variability over time. The correlation techniques were not designed with such time-series in mind” (Morgan 1997, 4-5). He recognized the difference between biometrics and the social sciences, and the question of which of the several tides of time was to be correlated had thus to find an answer. “The earliest writers saw the time-correlation problem as isolating the different components and correlating only similar components of two or more variables. It was usually of greater interest to economists to investigate correlation of short-term oscillations, in particular the movement through the trade or business cycle. Economic statisticians recognized that the correlation coefficients of unmanipulated observations only indicated a relationship between the secular changes” (Klein 1997, 229). As March stated,

In a careful analysis of the conditions of dependency between two statistical series, we have to calculate the coefficient of dependency between annual changes as well as between long-term changes, for instance decennial changes (1905, 32).

On this point, the 1905 study contains new techniques that could solve the time problem. March suggested that correlation of first differences could be used to capture the correlation of short-term changes​[9]​, whereas the correlation of long-term changes was based on a 10-year moving average. He applied the method to the relationship between the marriage rate and the birth rate in England, and also introduced lags in the analysis. But the paper was concealing another discovery. He exposed a method of time-series decomposition that was independently developed by Hooker in 1901 and Norton in 1902​[10]​ and that enabled him to isolate short-term changes defined as the deviations from a moving average that was representing the trending factor:

In order to offer a greater precision to our analysis, we have to decompose the changes that are studied (…). We can determine a coefficient of dependency between: (1) the courbes interpolées or courbes moyennes; (2) the differences between the observed numbers and these courbes moyennes (1905, 34).

He applied this decomposition to the study of the relationship marriage rate and unemployment (1905, 36).
That study undoubtedly deserves a special place in the history of econometrics and of time-series analysis. Moreover, two statisticians trained by March ―Bunle and Lenoir― used intensively these techniques in their respective blueprint​[11]​, and other pieces of work confirm that March and econometrics intersect, for instance his parametric estimation of a distribution of wages (March 1898). However, an econometric interpretation of his economic work would be misleading: he had a predilection for other statistical strategies, as his construction of a business barometer suggests​[12]​.

2.2.	March and business cycles: On barometric indexation

In the 1920s, March issued a challenge: the measurement of business cycles. He constructed a French business barometer ―a barometer being defined as “time-series representations of cyclical activity” (Morgan 1990, 57)― based on index numbers and seen as an equivalent to the Harvard barometer​[13]​.
Although his postulate was that business cycles were complex, in the sense that they result from “innumerable and very different economic facts” (1923, 252), he believed that they could be approached with the help of index numbers, seen as “instruments of observation and analysis” and “instruments of measurement” (1923, 277). But such numbers were also “conventions” (1923, 253): they were instruments of international comparison. March thus turned to indexes that were counterparts of those on which the previously constructed barometers were based: the price of financial values (A)​[14]​, the wholesale prices (B1), the British wholesale prices (B2) and the Banque de France discount rate (C), and ended up with “ABC” curves in the Persons’ style. His barometer (see the figure below) visualizes the cycles in France, England and the United States. It suggests the ways the various curves are related in cycles ―their “successions”, in March’s own words― and also a kind of international regularity: for instance, he remarked that “the ABC curves in England reveal the same pattern [than in the United States]: the oscillations of speculation precede those of prices, that are themselves followed by the oscillations of the discount rate” (1923, 177), despite the fact that these successions remain less apparent in the case of France.
Although March’s approach of index numbers remains sometimes unclear, he seems to view them as physical measurements of variables (1923, 277) ―like Mitchell and Fisher did (see Banzhaf in this volume)― whose assigned purpose was to get measures of the movement through time. The important thing for his approach of measurement was not the numbers as such ―compared to the point of the exercises discussed in this volume by Boumans and Banzhof, the numbers themselves were not the issue― but the search for graphic indicators that establish facts about economic phenomena and made possible the discovery of regularities, in the Mitchell style. Then, the existence of such regularities had to be verified by the indices de dépendance:

These movements can be usefully compared each others (…) in order to search possible links. I have already exposed in the Société [de Statistique de Paris] the adequate methods to reach this aim (1923, 263)​[15]​.

This means that March believed that graphs and indices were two complementary technologies that should be used hand in hand.
March’s views on cycle deserve two comments. First, he thought that index numbers “cannot be considered as precise” (1923, 277) and cannot take into account the whole range of circumstances ―this was to him a major difference between measurement in economics and in some natural sciences (1923, 277-8). However, he believed that a large variety of indices could help in narrowing uncertainties (1923, 278-9). Second, the complexity of business cycles was grounded in the belief that their origins could not be traced out to a single cause:

Cyclical fluctuations (…) cover phenomena of very different origins: meteorological accidents (dryness, frost, flooding, etc.), social accidents (wars, strikes), or monetary phenomena (1923, 271).

March did not use the term “fluctuation” by chance. To him, the possibility of strictly periodic cycles was rejected because economic conditions were moving in such a way that the length of cycles was expected to vary; business cycles were seen as recurrent but not strictly periodic. From that point of view, his approach of the cycle strongly differs from Jevons’ and Moore’s social astronomy (see Peart in this volume, and Le Gall 1999). Moreover, some of these phenomena could not be quantified and measured (1923, 270). This meant that institutions, history, and so forth, matter and consequently that partial theories were to be considered cautiously. 
Similar conclusions can be drawn from a paper published in 1912 on a statistical and graphical test of the quantity theory of money (considering the 1783-1910 period). March doubted on the relevance of such a simple relation and believed that “other factors have to be taken into account” (1912a, 114). This approach of monetary issues can here be contrasted with the episodes in the quantitative assessment of the value of money analyzed by Hoover and Dowell in this volume. A common concern of the authors they study was the search for causes, and some of them referred to Stuart Mill’s emphasis on a single main cause ​[16]​ ―although Mill thought that none of a multitude of significant causes can be extricated empirically from the others (Peart in this volume). By contrast, March found necessary to take straightaway into account the whole range of circumstances and developed a taste for a statistical approach that leaves no room for abstraction​[17]​ and that could respect the complexity of the real world. Note that he believed that statistics made possible the derivation of empirical regularities in the social world; yet, we suggest that such regularities could not be considered as laws.
March’s views on economic cycle ―and also on the quantity theory― show that he became more interested in the composition problem ―the interweaving of phenomena, that was to him the fundamental issue in the social sciences― than in the decomposition problem, although he remains known for his technical contribution to the latter. We also see that March largely practiced statistics, seen as a methodological path to observe the social world, but also that he constantly put forward the limits of his exercises. The understanding of such a weaving is to be found in his association of statistics and epistemological views.

3.	Approaching the lost world: Epistemological foundations of statistics

We believe that March’s statistical work cannot be separated from epistemological views: the various limits he put forward ―that were those of measurement and statistics― in both his theoretical and applied work originate in precise worldviews. March believed that the world was intrinsically complex, characterized by epistemic uncertainty, and out of reach ―a kind of lost world. However, this does not mean that he excluded realism from the range of science and of statistics: he conceived statistics as offering means for approaching ―and taming, in the sense of Hacking (1990)― this world and for allowing decision making in human societies.

3.1.	Correlation, historical time and causality: March attacks

March carefully delineated the range of application of correlation: it was a timeless tool and could not be considered as measuring causal relationships.
He realized that a correlation coefficient cannot be sufficient to analyze the relation between variables: it makes possible the quantification of the intensity of their association, but it leads to a loss of information in the sense that it crushes historical time. Yet, he thought that history matters within the social world, that the various circumstances could never be considered as constant: 

Economic laws, like every general formula, remain valid only during a certain period and under precise circumstances (1912a, 112).

However, unlike correlation, graphs visualize the economic movements over time:

From the point of view of descriptive statistics, [graphs] present (…) the schematic picture of the facts that can be measured. From the point of view of comparative (or analytical) statistics, they show the reciprocal relations between facts and can help in the discovery of what is constant in these relations. Moreover, they make easier the comparison of the various phases of a phenomenon, they reveal irregularities and anomalies (1905, 4).

This conviction led him to proclaim that correlation and graphs should not be separated ―and this was the methodological path he followed while approaching business cycles, as seen above. This idea originates in the 1905 study, whose title was suggestive: Les Représentations Graphiques et la Statistique Comparative. If that study is nowadays known as including pioneering results on correlation, it also contains long developments on graphs that remain neglected. Yet, its originality lies in the association of both tools providing a “control” for each other:

The alliance of graphic processes and of calculus makes possible a precise analysis of the links between facts, as far as we can evaluate the appearances and the particularities that can be measured. The result is a method of investigation and of control that should be recommended (1905, 40).

Morgan precisely shows that correlation was a measure of the strength of an atemporal relation between variables, whereas “the arguments from graphs were concerned with explanations of specific historical time series” (1997, 42). She indeed suggests that “the correlation coefficient could be regarded as in some sense a technological improvement, but that most economic statisticians continued [at the turn of the century] to use graphic methods extensively (…). Correlation (…) does not tell you the history of the variable or help you to explain what has happened nor even help you to predict a time series; it is a complementary, not replacement, technology” (1997, 44-5).
	If correlation was thus associated with graphs, it was dissociated from causality. As early as 1905, March pointed out a basic difference between the indices de dépendance ―including Pearson’s correlation coefficient― and causality, a basic difference​[18]​ that he carefully explained from the early 1910s to his 1930 blueprint, Les Principes de la Méthode Statistique. His arguments largely originate in Pearson’s positivist thought, as his translation into French of the third edition of The Grammar of Science suggests. That book, as well as the whole work of Pearson, was an indictment for causality, in the sense that we cannot gain access to causes; instead, we perceive correlations:

Nowhere do we find perfect lawlikeness, he stressed. Everywhere we find correlations. That is, even in mechanics there is always some unexplained variation. This should cause us no distress. The possibility of science depends only in the most general way on the nature of the phenomena being investigated. A correlation, after all, is not a deep truth about the world, but a convenient way of summarizing experience. Pearson’s conception of science was more a social than a natural philosophy. The key to science he found not in the world, but in an ordered method of investigation. For Pearson, scientific knowledge depended on a correct approach, and this meant, first of all, the taming of human subjectivity (Porter 1995, 21).

March and Pearson were led to believe that causality was a “pure concept” or a “conceptual limit”, i.e. a particular case whose realism had to be questioned ―an idea expressed by March in his preface of the book:

The author of the Grammar adopts Hume’s idea, according to which no internal necessity, and consequently no absolute is existing between cause and effect. The succeeding events [successions] never reappear in an identical way; the notion of causality is once more a borderline notion [notion-limite] that goes beyond sensible experience. A more or less close statistical agreement is only existing between the changes of the cause and those of the effect (1912b, v).

This concept of notion-limite indicates that for March, there was an epistemological barrier to grasping all causal influences in concrete cases. With Pearson, he claimed that causal relationships were just simple and particular “images” of the world (1931, 475) ―“simplicity of nature is ultimately a simplification introduced by a mysterious power, the mental mechanism” (March 1912, iv)― that should leave room for a recognition that the universe was not so simple and was rather inaccessible. Consequently, the general case became a “space in between”: the absolute independence and dependence were just borderline cases, whereas the general rule was the continuum of intermediate situations, i.e. “the various degrees of association” (Pearson 1912, 200). Correlation was precisely the adequate tool for measuring the association between two variables, but without any possibility to infer the existence of a causal relation.
	At that stage, we can remark that March’s approach is to be contrasted with the unwavering faith of other authors in correlation, such as Moore​[19]​ and Hooker (Morgan 1990; Le Gall 1999). Moreover, this differentiation of causality and correlation strongly influenced the subsequent French pioneers of econometrics, and in a more prim fashion Lenoir (Chaigneau and Le Gall 1998). Furthermore, in order to avoid confusions generated by previous studies such as Moore’s ones, March rejected the use of the word “correlation” in the applied work and had a predilection for the words covariation or concomittance, that were to him causality free​[20]​.
Both cases (the alliance of correlation and graphs and the dissociation of causality from correlation) can find explanations in worldviews that deserve a particular place to history and that make impossible the search for causal relationships.

3.2.	Measuring and taming the lost world

A key is to be found in his belief in the “variability”​[21]​ and the “complexity” of the world, to use his own words. Although some regularities and even a certain determinism could be unveiled by statistics (1924, 351), he thought that Nature ―and especially the human world― was characterized by permanent change, by epistemic uncertainty. No absolute determinism was ruling society, in the sense that man permanently acts on reality and that social facts depend on human will that cannot be understood (1924, 350). This explains that history matters and that “variability” was permanently at work. Moreover, a large variety of phenomena were tied up in such a way that their knowledge was out of reach ―and here we find an explanation of his rejection of the search for causal relationships.
	But how to deal with such a world? March thought that the social scientist could not understand it, and he rejected the construction of “pseudo-realities”, to use a contemporary word, that aimed at modeling and reproducing the universe​[22]​ and that were only belonging to the range of “images”. He indeed claimed that no “anthropomorphism” (1908, 294) could exist between a theoretical world ―in the sense of an abstract model― and the real world:

Certainty or scientific evidence results from an accordance between thought and itself (…). Scientific certainty only exists in the world of concepts (1912b, iii).

In other words, March was delineating a frontier between the real and inaccessible world and any theoretical world, where certainty can prevail but has no realistic counterpart. “Pseudo-realities” were certain in the sense that they obey to formal rules of logic, but given the inaccessibility of the real world, they could never be satisfying: “a theory is only satisfying if it covers [embrasse] the whole facts” (1909, 258). The way the universe was functioning was thus out of reach.
However, no renouncement to study reality per se was at work here. The world could not be exhaustively understood, but could be approximately observed and measured. Here we understand the pivotal role of statistics for March: it was the unique way to approach reality. His worldviews were thus paving the way for kinds of monographs that clear some space to a large variety of indicators:

In physical meteorology, we never obtain the best forecasts on the basis of a single look at the barometer, but on the basis of observations of the thermometer, the hydrometer and the weather vane. I doubt that a single index that would be a synthesis of these four observations could be more useful than four indications taken separately (…). Similarly, in the observation of business movement, we have to avoid a unique basis; it is useful to examine the whole basis (1923, 281).

Such an increase in the number of measures could lead to a convergence towards more certain knowledge. However, he also developed a more pessimistic idea: scientists would like to believe in such a convergence ―we interpret this belief as a convention―, but “the unknown and the known increase jointly” (1912, v). Moreover, the social scientist could never be certain that he has reached reality: the regularities he extracted could have been different in another context, with other tools. “Reality is just a trace [vestige] in the large set of possibilities” (1924, 346); in that sense, statistics was only the expression of possibilities ―it affords means to study facts, but it remains impossible to infer that we have reach reality.
	Such an epistemological view was a watershed. March was rejecting 19th century beliefs, and in a more prim fashion the deterministic conception of the social world. Previous statisticians or economists such as Quételet, Regnault or Moore, based their studies on the belief that simple and deterministic laws were at work ―that, after all, Nature was driven by a few wheels. This also explains the mathematical modeling of the human world that is to be found in the work of some of these authors. By contrast, March remained impervious to mathematical economics. He perceived a complexity at work in reality, and this idea led to a reorientation of the statistical work: statistics was not a means to approximate determinism anymore, but aimed now at approaching and measuring an evasive Nature. In a sense, March’s thought illustrates the way the development of statistics began to tame chance at the turn-of-the-century, because it made it amenable to analysis and brought it under control ―as Hacking emphasized when he shows the way Galton’s tools represent “a fundamental transition in the conception of statistical laws” (1990, 181). Moreover, recent work by Israel (1996; 2000) suggests that the erosion of determinism in science during the turn of the century era cleared space for kinds of instrumentalism ―in the sense that the aim of science became more the reproduction than the understanding of reality​[23]​. Yet, March never rejected the study of reality: he kept from 19th scientists the idea that science should tell something on reality ―such a belief was to him an obstacle to the development of instrumental models―, although the social world was henceforth seen as not intrinsically simple.




March’s statistical style can be understood as the search for tools and indicators that make possible an approximate measurement of the social world ―a quest that was only meaningful with respect to precise epistemological views. We believe that his involvement in measurement was closely associated with the belief that a unique research path was existing in the social sciences: observation, that should here be understood as generating knowledge per se and not only as a prerequisite for future explanations, for instance for the construction of mathematical models.
Our history of March’s statistical style can illuminate the way the relations between measurement, statistics and economics was conceived in France during the early 20th century, and contribute to understand why it took this shape. March’s statistical style ―that, in certain respects, shares much in common with the American statistical parades of the 1910s and with the NBER and Mitchell approach― can explain the lack of recognition of contributions to pre-probabilistic econometrics that rose at the SGF during the early 1910s, those of Bunle and Lenoir ―both were finally led to follow March’s statistical path. But March’s stamp was deeper: this statistical style flourished in the country and contributed to impulse a particular direction to public statistics. Between 1920 and WW2, the SGF ―then run by Huber, largely trained by March― followed this path and after WW2, the INSEE​[26]​ developed an approach associated with national accounting and that largely remained impervious to mathematical methods, to the Cowles methods and statistical inference, seen as a conservative practice based on the observation of the past (Malinvaud 1991). In some respects, that strategy was a feature of French economic thought during the period (Le Gall 2001b).
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^1	  March had no academic position. Yet, it should be noted that in 1920, he became involved with Emile Borel in the creation of the Institut de Statistique de l’Université de Paris, that played an important role in the training of statisticians in France (Desrosières 1993).
^2	  All translations from French are ours.
^3	  On the history of the OT, see Luciani (1992).
^4	  The history of the SGF is rather meandering, in the sense that it is characterized by a successive dependency on various ministries and administrations (see Marietti 1947).
^5	  See for instance March (1929). See Carol (1995) and Desrosières (1993, 1998) on his involvement in eugenics.
^6	  The collection of data was not a purely observational process: it was preceded by a priori beliefs (1930a, 36).
^7	  As explained in part three, these indices were seen by March as closely tied to graphs.
^8	  March presented two coefficients of dependency devised by Fechner. The first one is: , where c is the “number of agreements” ―i.e. cases in which the two series move in the same direction― and d is the “number of disagreements” ―i.e. the opposite case. However, “this index does not take into account the magnitude of the compared differences” (1905, 26). March also referred to another coefficient, defined as , where C is the sum of the product of the “agreements” for each period of time and D is the sum of the “disagreements” for each period of time. However, this index “does not sufficiently take into account the amplitude of the compared variations” (1905, 27).
^9	  A similar method was independently suggested by Hooker in 1905. See Klein (1997) and Morgan (1990).
^10	  See Klein (1997). Note that in 1863, Regnault ―a French neglected economist― laid the basis of such a decomposition in his modeling of the stock market (Jovanovic 2000; Jovanovic and Le Gall 2001).
^11	  On Bunle (1911) and Lenoir (1913), see Chaigneau and Le Gall (1998), Desrosières (1993), Hendry and Morgan (1995) and Morgan (1990).
^12	  March’s research path can here be contrasted with that of Hooker (on Hooker, see Klein 1997; Morgan 1990, 1997). Around 1900, both looked at similar problems but March’s path ran in an almost opposite direction and got most interested in the historical time. This contributes to explain that the correlation coefficient was little used in the papers he published after 1905.
^13	  On a history of business barometers, see Armatte (1992).
^14	  During the 1910s, the statisticians of the SGF became interested in the influence of the stock market fluctuations on economic activity, and Lenoir became in charge of that issue. In a first step, he developed in 1919 the first long term indices relative to the French stock market. This step was in fact including the construction of two indices: an index relative to bonds (including seventeen securities) and an index relative to stocks (including one hundred and eighty six securities, decomposed in twenty five sector-based sub-indices). In a second step, he constructed after 1919 several indices that were complementary to the above mentioned ones and also monthly indices. That work by Lenoir deserves two brief comments. First, it is an illustration of the role of the SGF: the construction of instruments that make possible the observation of economic activity. Second, it was closely associated with graphs, that were used to infer some relations between the stock market and economic activity.
^15	  He made here no use of correlation.
^16	  According to Zouboulakis (1990), Mill and the economists of the “Ricardian tradition” had to demonstrate the relevance of an analytical approach which was based on the isolation of economic phenomena. Their answer rested on an argument ―the “composition of causes”― directly emanating from mechanics: when an effect depends on a concurrence of causes, these causes must be studied one by one, and their laws separated in order to obtain, eventually, the law of the whole phenomena. See also Le Gall and Robert (1999).
^17	  By contrast, “Mill thought that abstractions were necessary to the scientific pretensions of political economy because they would reveal the true nature of economic activity to us”, although “he did not think that that was all you needed in order to explain things in the economy” (Morgan forthcoming, 153).
^18	  Of course, with correlation, no dependency is explicit just a co-relationship. Yet, recent histories of econometrics and of statistics show that at the turn-of-the-century, several scholars read causality into it (see below).
^19	  In a review of Laws of Wages: An Essay in Statistical Economics (1911), March harshly criticized Moore’s assimilation of correlation and causality (see 1912c, 368).
^20	  Yet, in the 1905-paper, March still used the word dépendance for “euphony reasons” (1905, 18).
^21	  This is, once more, close to Mill’s statement: there is “mere any two cases exactly similar” (Peart in this volume).
^22	  The argument remains close to the distinction between statistics and the experimental method.
^23	  Such a historical analysis perfectly fits the history of econometrics (Le Gall 2001a).
^24	  For the visual language of the graphs provides not just an indicator of where the economy is going (as a barometer), but a whole picture of what it has gone through. March’s “barometer” was not just an instrument of observation but more nearly an instrument of current indication and of prediction.
^25	  We do not believe here that this emphasis on using statistics for prediction rather than explanation was exclusively influenced by his practical work for the government. We more generally suggest that it was associated with and resulted from well-shaped epistemological views.
^26	  The SGF became the INSEE in 1946.
